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§ 9-206*-Merchants know that extensive use of
time payment or installment purchase plans is commercially advantageous. Ready credit encourages the purchase, and the merchant can avoid tying up his liquid assets if he discounts the note
or contract evidencing the debt to a third party, usually a bank or
finance company specializing in credit financing. The amount by
which the note must be discounted before sale to the financing party
depends on several factors. Certainly, the risk of insolvency of the
maker is one consideration; whether the maker can interpose defenses arising from the original transaction is another. The risk of
loss to the finance company due to insolvency of the maker is decreased when the finance company is assigned a contract of sale
because the purchased item then serves as collateral. The interposition of defenses may usually be forestalled if the finance company
acquires a promissory note as a holder in due course. It is therefore
common for the merchant to require a conditional sale contract,
or similar security agreement, and a promissory note from the purchaser, both to be assigned to the finance company.
Because the maker's defenses are thereby cut off, this practice can
be unfair. The courts have recognized this, and have adopted ways
to curtail questionable practices. The New Mexico Supreme Court,
in State Nat'l Bank v. Cantrell,' struck down this practice, but the
court did not distinguish between unscrupulous and reputable business institutions. Most other jurisdictions have taken a more moderate approach by examining the particular relationship between
the merchant and the finance company to determine if the finance
MERCIAL CODE

company is, in fact, a "true" holder in due course. The Uniform

Commercial Code, now in wide acceptance, incorporates many of the
limitations imposed by the majority of jurisdictions for transactions
involving the purchase of non-consumer goods, and allows more
stringent regulation on a state-to-state basis in the case of consumer
goods.2 The focus of this Comment is on the question whether, in
* N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-9-206 (Repl. 1962) ; State Nat'l Bank v. Cantrell, 47 N.M.
389, 143 P.2d 592, Annot., 152 A.L.R. 1216 (1943).
1. 47 N.M. 389, 143 P.2d 592 (1943).
2. New Mexico's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§
50A-1-101 to 50A-9-507 (Repl. 1962), is based on the 1958 Official Text. References
made to the comments to the UCC are those appearing with the 1962 Official Text as
promulgated by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
References to New Mexico's version will be designated "UCC" both in footnote and
text, omitting the full statutory citation.
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view of the Cantrell decision, the New Mexico Supreme Court will
apply the more stringent regulation available under the UCC for
transactions having their origin in the purchase of consumer goods.
In Cantrell, the merchant sold an air conditioning unit to the defendant, taking a down payment and securing the balance with a
promissory note. The unit was for use in the defendant's restaurant;
hence, under the UCC, it would be classified as non-consumer goods.3
At the time of sale a conditional sale contract was executed which
provided, among other things, that the equipment was guaranteed
for five years. Immediately thereafter, the plaintiff bank notified
the defendant of the fact that it was about to purchase the note and
contract from the merchant. The bank asked the defendant to sign
and return a letter reciting that the equipment purchased "has been
completely installed and is satisfactory" and promising to "make
payments on the note in accordance with its demands, as due." The
defendant signed and returned this letter after the installation of
the unit, but before he had had time to actually use it. The next
morning he discovered that the equipment was unsatisfactory. When
the merchant refused to comply with the guarantee, the defendant
had the unit removed from the restaurant at his own expense.
After the defendant's default in payment, the plaintiff bank
brought suit on the promissory note, the defendant counterclaiming for breach of warranty. The trial court found against the plaintiff and awarded the defendant fifty-seven dollars on his counterclaim. The plaintiff appealed, contending that as a holder in due
course he was free from the breach of warranty defense set up by
the defendant's counterclaim and was therefore entitled to judgment on the promissory note. Upon appeal to the New Mexico
Supreme Court, held, Affirmed.'
The supreme court recognized that, even though the bank knew
the consideration for the note was an executory contract, this alone
would create no right in the maker of the note to interpose the
breach of an underlying contract as a defense. 5 The supreme court
also conceded that the promissory note was a negotiable instrument,
and that the plaintiff was a holder in due course. Nevertheless, the
plaintiff was also the assignee of the conditional sale contract, executed and transferred at the same time and as part of the same trans3. For the UCC definition of consumer goods, see section 9-109, set out at p. 416
infra.
4. 47 N.M. at 394, 143 P.2d at 595.
5. Commercial Credit Co. v. Summers, 154 Miss. 501, 122 So. 541 (1929) ; 8 Am.
Jur. Bills & Notes, § 401 (1937).
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action; the plaintiff, as assignee, was thereby possessed of the rights
conferred by the contract and burdened with the obligations it imposed.' By virtue of the New Mexico counterclaim statute, the
defendant was "entitled to plead as a counterclaim the breach of
warranty as 'a cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's
claim, or connected with the subject of the action' . . . or as 'any
other cause of action arising also on contract and existing at the
commencement of the action.' "8
The bank also claimed on appeal that the agreement in the letter
signed by the defendant should estop the defendant from asserting
his breach of warranty defense. 9 The supreme court indicated that
this question had not been properly presented at trial and should
not be first raised on appeal. Regardless of this, the plaintiff's contention would not have prevailed. The supreme court could not
find sufficient evidence showing that the plaintiff had relied on the
letter in purchasing the note and contract. It further appeared that
the defendant had signed the letter without full knowledge of the
pertinent facts.' ° Absent these essential elements, the doctrine of
estoppel was inapplicable.
If Cantrell has a meaning beyond the interpretation of the counterclaim statute," it is gleaned from this statement by the court:
6. 47 N.M. at 392, 143 P.2d at 594, citing Zederman v. Thompson, 17 N.M. 56, 121
Pac. 609 (1912), and Doub v. Rawson, 142 Wash. 190, 252 Pac. 920 (1927).
7. N.M. Laws 1897, ch. 73, §41, superseded by N.M. Stat. Ann. 21-1-1(13) (1953).
8. 47 N.M. at 392, 143 P.2d at 595.
9. On the issue of estoppel, itself beyond the scope of this Comment, see Annot.,
44 A.L.R.2d 8 (1955).
10. Full knowledge isan essential element of an estoppel, as pointed out in Dye v.
Cantrell appeal, State Nat'l Bank
Crary, 13 N.M.439, 85 Pac. 1038 (1906). The first
v. Cantrell, 46 N.M. 268, 127 P.2d 246 (1942), resulted in the supreme court remandcourt to make certain findings of fact. One such finding was
ing the case for the trial
that the defendant did not know, until advised by a mechanic, that part of the equipment purchased was second-hand.
11. The counterclaim statute was determinative of the case. One of the plaintiff's
contentions in a petition for rehearing was that Texas law should apply. The supreme
court's opinion on rehearing stated that the court agreed with the correctness of the
Texas cases cited because they were in accord with Azar v. Slack, 29 N.M. 528, 224
Pac. 398 (1924), which held that the holder of a promissory note is not precluded from
being a holder in due course unless it is affirmatively shown that the breach of an underlying contract occurred prior to transfer of the note, and that the assignee had
knowledge of the breach. The supreme court in Cantrell went on to say:
Where the plaintiff loses isnot because of any difference in the law of the
two states on the question presented but, rather, in failing to challenge successfully the defendant's right under our then controlling statute on counterclaims
. .. or under the Texas statute as well as for that matter (Art. 2017, Vernon's
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The defendant signed the letter on the assumption that, since the

plaintiff was purchasing both the contract and the note, it would be
under the same obligation to fulfill the terms of the contract as the
original seller, its assignor. 12
This is at least some indication that the court was interested in protecting the reasonable expectations of a purchaser who had signed
a promissory note.
The Cantrell decision announced this rule: If the purchaser of a
negotiable instrument is simultaneously assigned a conditional sale
contract, he is subject to all defenses arising from the contract, even
though he is a holder in due course of the note. This formulation is
known as the "single contract" theory. 8
The "single contract" theory renders a negotiable instrument nonnegotiable, and, in doing so, may well be said to defeat the reasonable expectations of the finance company. For example, the finance
company, having acquired the status of a holder in due course of
the note, also acquires the additional security supposedly afforded
by a sale contract, only to discover that it has not improved its position but has actually destroyed a large portion of the value of being
a holder in due course. It has been suggested 14 that the finance company could avoid this unfavorable result by either (1) taking the
assignment of the sale contract at a later date, or (2) not taking
an assignment of the sale contract at all, but entering into a trust
Rev. Civ. Stat. 1936), to set up against the plaintiff . . . his cause of action
for breach of warranty under the conditional sales contract.
47 N.M. at 394, 143 P.2d at 596.
12. Id. at 393, 143 P.2d at 595.
13. The single contract theory finds occasional support in other jurisdictions. First
& Lumberman's Nat'l Bank v. Buchholz, 220 Minn. 97, 18 N.W.2d 771 (1945), reached
the same result as Cantrell on almost identical facts, without reference to a counterclaim statute. Cooke v. Real Estate Trust Co., 180 Md., 133, 22 A.2d 554 (1941), used
the single contract theory to limit the remedies of the financing institution to those
contained in the conditional sale contract; the promissory note and conditional sale
contract having been simultaneously delivered and assigned. In Cooke, the Maryland
court distinguished between cases involving notice of an executory contract as consideration for the note and cases involving notice to the finance company, albeit in the
sale contract, that liability was conditional. Cf. Griffin v. Baltimore Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 204 Md. 154, 102 A.2d 804 (1954).
New York has followed the single contract theory in at least one case, Federal Credit
Bureau v. Zelkor Dining Car Corp., 238 App. Div. 379, 264 N.Y.S. 723 (1933), but a
federal court in United States v. Novsam Realty Corp., 125 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1942),
declared Zelkor to be out of line with the weight of New York authority. But see
Mohawk Nat'l Bank v. Chalifaux, 33 Misc. 2d 987, 227 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
In accordance with Cantrell are: Todd v. State Bank, 182 Iowa 276, 165 N.W. 593
(1917) ; Von Nordheim v. Cornelius, 129 Neb. 719, 262 N.W. 832 (1935).
14. See Annot., 152 A.L.R. 1216, 1222-24 (1943).
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agreement with the merchant providing that if the note becomes uncollectible because of the maker's insolvency, the finance company
will be subrogated to whatever right the merchant has to repossess
the property. 5 The latter method, though not entirely satisfactory,
at least would not impinge upon the finance company's remedy of
suing on the note as a holder in due course.
The "single contract" theory has not met with wide acceptance
because it shocks traditional notions of negotiable instrument law
and can, at least theoretically, be easily circumvented. However,
many courts, rejecting the conceptual basis of the "single contract"
theory, invoke other rationales to reach similar results. The thrust
of these rationales is generally directed toward unscrupulous business practices, rather than negotiable instrument law. For example,
a contract of sale containing provisions purporting to give the contract negotiable characteristics has been struck down as an attempt
to create a "new form of negotiable instrument."' 6 Alternatively,
courts may feel that the relationship between the finance company
and the merchant is such that they are, in effect, one and the same. 1
The finance company could not then in good faith claim the benefits
of holdership in due course; the finance company should be charged
with full knowledge of the transaction underlying the creation of
the note. 8
As a practical matter, the finance company can circumvent the
rationale of the Cantrell decision simply by incorporating in the sale
contract a clause providing that the maker will settle all claims
against the merchant directly with the merchant, or by a clause
15. In those jurisdictions finding the finance company not to be a holder in due
course because of the closeness of association with the merchant, see notes 16, 25, & 26
infra, it is likely that such a trust agreement would only serve as an additional justification for denying the finance company the status of a holder in due course.
16. Banco Merchantil, S.A. v. Sauls, Inc., 140 Cal. App. 2d 316, 295 P.2d 55 (1956)
American Nat'l Bank v. A. G. Sommerville, Inc., 191 Cal. 364, 216 Pac. 376 (1923)
Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 162 Wash. 449, 298 Pac. 705, Annot., 79 A.L.R.
29 (1931).
Conditional sale contracts by themselves are normally held to be non-negotiable.
See e.g., Security Fin. Co. v. Comini, 119 Ore. 460, 249.Pac. 1054 (1926).
17. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940),
in which the contract of sale, prepared by the finance company, contained a printed
assignment to the company on its reverse side. See also cases cited in notes 25 & 26 inIra.
18. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953), 44 A.L.R.2d 1 (1955). In
Martin, the Florida Supreme Court considered and rejected the idea expressed in
Cantrell and other cases that negotiability could be affected by a simultaneous execution of a conditional sale contract and a promissory note. Regardless of this, the
Florida court said that the finance company could not be heard to claim to be in
good faith a holder in due course.
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waiving the maker's right to assert defenses to the contract against
an assignee of the merchant. Under such a clause, the maker, unlike
the defendant in Cantrell, cannot expect the assignee to be under the
same obligations to fulfill the terms of the contract as the merchant.
The use of such a clause has several practical effects: (1) It
places the risk of the possible insolvency of the merchant on the
maker. (2) It places the burden on the maker to locate the merchant for suit on the breach of contract. (3) It deprives the maker
of the possibility that by refusing to make payments on the note
he could compel the merchant to comply with the terms of his contract-the maker must, under such a clause, bear the expense of
instituting a separate action against the merchant for breach of
contract.1"
These clauses have met with varying degrees of success. Most
jurisdictions have given them effect, in the absence of some special
affront to public policy or public interest.2 ° Conversely, even those
opinions most strongly upholding the duty of the maker to abide
by his contract indicate2 1 that if his defense arises from conduct involving moral turpitude on the part of the merchant the clause
would be a nullity.22 The trend 23 is to more freely find a public policy
19. Conversely, it can be argued that the purchaser should not be allowed to
complain of these burdens because if he had borrowed directly from a finance company, made the purchase, and then given the finance company a security agreement
with the purchase item serving as collateral, he could certainly not then interpose
against the finance company defenses arising between himself and the merchant.
20. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Biagi, 11 Ill.
App. 2d 80, 136 N.E.2d 580 (1956)
Young v. John Deere Plow Co., 102 Ga. App. 132, 115 S.E.2d 770 (1960) ; Jones v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 88 Ga. App. 24, 75 S.E.2d 822 (1953). See also
Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Haskew, 194 Ark. 549, 108 S.W.2d 908, 909 (1937), in
which the court observed that the buyer was "a grown man, a teacher in the public
schools. . . . Courts are not permitted to make contracts for a person sui juris....
In United States ex rel. Adm'r v. Troy-Parisian, Inc., 115 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1940), a
case involving breach of warranty on laundry equipment, the court said:
Buyer and seller stood on equal footing and it is evident that this clause was
deliberately inserted as a means of facilitating the financing of the sale through
the named local bank. Unless in circumstances affronting public policy, it is
not part of the business of the courts to decline to give effect to contracts which
the parties have fairly and deliberately made.
115 F.2d at 226.
21. For example, see the qualifications placed on the holding in United States ex rel.
Adm'r v. Troy-Parisian, Inc., supra note 20.
22. Fraud and usury are examples of such affronts to public policy. The issue of
fraud is the most frequently litigated. It is commonly said that the fraud that vitiates
the contract also vitiates the waiver clause. See Equipment Acceptance Corp. v.
Arwood Can Mfg. Co., 117 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1941) ; American Nat'l Bank v. A. G.
Sommerville, Inc., 191 Cal. 364, 216 Pac. 376 (1923); Pacific Acceptance Corp v.
Whalen, 43 Idaho 15, 248 Pac. 444 (1926) ; Progressive Fin. & Realty Co. v. Stempel,
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involved, and therefore to refuse to give the clause effect. The trend
is based on this philosophy:
It is difficult to conceive that such a clause could ever be suggested
by a party to a contract, unless there was in his own mind at least a
lingering doubt as to the honesty and integrity of his conduct ...
Public policy and morality are both ignored if such an agreement can
24
be given effect in a court of justice.
Many decisions indicate quite frankly that the burdens placed on
the maker by the use of such a clause are too great to be tolerated.
The burdens of a merchant's insolvency and unscrupulous conduct
should fall, regardless of the terms of the contract, 25 upon the merchant's cohort, 26 the finance company. A partial justification for so
231 Mo. App. 721, 95 S.W.2d 834 (1933) ; Mohawk Nat'l Bank v. Chalifaux, 33 Misc.
2d 987, 227 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ; Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 162
Wash. 449, 298 Pac. 705 (1931); Malos v. Lounsbury, 193 Wis. 531, 214 N.W. 332
(1927) ; 12 Am. Jur. Contracts § 182 (1938).
23. See Henson, Chattel Mortgages in Illinois v. Secured Transactions Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 9 De Paul L. Rev. 125, 136 n.50 (1960).
24. Bridger v. Goldsmith, 143 N.Y. 424, 38 N.E. 458, 459 (1894).
25. The rationale is that the court should look behind the printed word in the sale
contract to the relationship between the finance company and the merchant. If a "close
enough" association exists, it, rather than the contract, is determinative. The problem is to decide what is "close enough." Most courts feel that merely supplying the
forms for the transaction will not vitiate the waiver clause unless the form supplied
contains some reference to the finance company, as did the printed assignment on the
back of the sale contract in Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d
260 (1940), or a reference to the name of the financing institution, Buffalo Indus. Bank
v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y. Supp. 783 (Sup. Ct. 1937). In Allied Bldg.
Credits, Inc. v. Miller, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 438 (County Ct. 1956), the court reviews the
decisions and concludes that something more than the supplying of the forms should
be required in order to bar the plaintiff from holder in due course status. In the
Miller case, the plaintiff had indeed gone much further. It appeared that the finance
company had required the execution of the particular instrument in question as a condition precedent to the granting of the loan. The court in Miller quoted from Allied
Bldg. Credits, Inc. v. Ellis, 258 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953):
Appellant Finance Company, who purchased the note . . . not only had
knowledge of the additional instrument, but actually caused it to be executed.
Appellant by its course of action becomes an original party to the additional
instrument; and forfeits what might otherwise have been its status as a holder
in due course.
7 Pa. D. & C.2d at 441-42 (emphasis by the court). See also Industrial Loan & Trust Co.
v. Bell, 300 Ill. App. 502, 21 N.E.2d 638 (1939).
26. Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De Marzio, supra note 25:
[S]hould [the finance company] be unbound by the representations to the buyer
made by the sales division of the joint business, representations, and promises
at variance with the terms of the printed form, a printed form impossible of
reading in the present instance save with a magnifying glass, and comprehensible only by a commercial lawyer? Should we thus throw the burden of
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allocating the burden is that the finance company in its ordinary
course of business can more easily protect itself from loss. 2 7

The UCC provision in this area is section 9-206, which provides:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule
for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer that
he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he
may have against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee who
takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of
a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under
the Article on Commercial Paper (Article 3). A buyer who as part
of one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security
agreement makes such an agreement.
An earlier draft of the UCC provided that in the field of consumer
goods such an agreement could not be enforced. 28 However, the interests of the financing institutions in the broad field of consumer
goods financing was recognized in the draft eventually adopted,
each state being allowed to design its own limitations. 29 This flexcaution on the untrained run-of-the-mill buyer, who by every means known

to sales artistry has been induced to believe that he is dealing with an honorable house? Should not the risk of the fraud and misrepresentation of the
salesman be the risk of the business, rather than the risk of the unwary buyer?
296 N.Y. Supp. at 786.
27. A common procedure affording some protection is for the company to withhold
a percentage of the total consideration paid for the note until the payments are completed by the purchaser. In Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66
N.W.2d 657 (1954), the court pointed out that if such an arrangement were found to
be sufficient to prevent the finance company from being a holder in due course this
would lead to the abolition of dealer's reserve accounts and would therefore result
in higher finance charges as an alternative method of protection.
28. UCC§9-206(1) (1952):
An agreement by a buyer of consumer goods as part of the contract for
sale that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense arising
out of the sale is not enforceable by any person. If a buyer as part of one
transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement
even a holder in due course of the negotiable instrument is subject to such
claim or defense if he seeks to enforce the security interest either by proceeding under the security agreement or by attaching or levying upon the
goods in an action upon the instrument.
29. The recognition of the validity of agreements to waive defenses against
assignees in the UCC may serve as a deterrent to a casual, and perhaps needless, finding that such agreements are void as against public policy. Consider Walter J. Hieb
Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 332 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1959),
dealing with non-consumer goods, in which the court rejected a contention that the
waiver clause should be voided by pointing out that the UCC gave effect to such
waivers.
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ibility wisely permits appropriate judicial action if, and only if, purchaser protection is needed. 0
Section 9-109 defines goods as " 'consumer goods' if they are used
or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household
purposes." In providing different rules for consumer and non-consumer goods, the UCC implies that the consumer is less able to protect his own interests than the purchaser of business goods. Although this view is arguable, the rationale breaks down when the
item purchased could be classified as either consumer goods or as
equipment-a physician's car or a farmer's jeep. Comment 2 to
section 9-109 states that the classes of goods are mutually exclusive
and that in such borderline cases the principal use to which the
property is put should be considered as determinative; no distinction
based on "expertise" is recognized.
What might thus be a doorway through the UCC allowing
abusive or questionable financing practices in transactions involving goods other than consumer goods is partially closed by four
conditions precedent: (1) the assignee must take in "good faith,"
(2) for value,' (3) without notice3 2 of a claim or defense, and
30. It is arguable from a literal reading of section 9-206 of the 1958 and 1962
versions of the UCC that the clause "subject to any statute or decision which establishes
a different rule" (emphasis added) refers only to those states which have such a
statute or decision prior to the adoption of the UCC. This construction prevents the
term "statute" in the clause from being a redundancy, i.e., the legislature could at
any time take action to amend an offensive UCC provision. However, comment 2 to
section 9-206 states thai "this article takes no position on the controversial question
whether a buyer of consumer goods may effectively waive defenses by contractual
clause or by execution of a negotiable note." This comment implies that it is not the intention of the UCC to preserve the status quo in jurisdictions where judicial regulation
may in the future be necessary or forthcoming, but not yet decided. The later interpretation of the UCC seems more logical and practical; rapid changes in financing
techniques may necessitate judicial regulation now which would have been needless
in the past.
31. "Value" is defined more restrictively in section 3-303, referring to the requirements for holdership in due course, than the general definition in section 1-201 (44)
which is applicable to article 9. Thus, there exists a possibility under the UCC that an
assignee not able to qualify as a holder in due course of an accompanying promissory
note may still be able to cut off the buyer's defense under the section 9-206 assignee
clause. This is similarly possible if the promissory note is overdue; under section
3-302(1) (c) notice that a note is overdue bars holdership in due course, but there is
no comparable requirement for the assignee under article 9.
32. Section 1-201 (25) provides:
A person has 'notice' of a fact when (a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received notice or notification of it; or (c) from all the facts
and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to
know that it exists.
It would require little effort to find the existence of "reason to know" when the association between the finance company and the merchant is very close, paricularly so
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(4) in no event are the so-called "real defenses" cut off. 3 In view
of these requisites, one may well conclude that the UCC simply incorporates the various theories created by case law for the protection of the purchaser.
Section 1-201 (19) defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned." This definition is made applicable to article 9 by section 9-105 (4). This definition has been said
to open a Pandora's box of flexibility and interpretation-its meaning may well vary with its context throughout the UCC.34 How it
will be construed in application to section 9-206 is yet to be seen.
The meaning of good faith is, of course, of prime importance to
finance companies that, in decisions prior to the adoption of the
UCC, have had makers successfully interpose defenses because the
finance company was not in good faith a holder in due course. 5
These decisions drew no distinction between purchasers of consumer
or non-consumer goods. Rather, the decisions were based on what
was regarded as a compelling public policy. It would not seem
illogical for these same courts to find a "different rule" for consumer
goods and to also be liberal in extending protection to the purchaser
of non-consumer goods because the assignee did not take in good
faith.
Section 9-206 expressly buries the single contract theory in New
Mexico; by execution of a promissory note and a security agreement, the purchaser makes "such an agreement" not to assert defenses against the assignee of the contract. The question remains,
however, whether a different rule can be found for purchasers of
consumer goods. Section 50-7-1 of the New Mexico statutes provides:
if the merchant and the finance company are units of a larger business establishment.
See dictum in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766,
214 P.2d 819 (1950) ; Buffalo Indus. Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y.
Supp. 783 (Sup. Ct. 1937). Cf. Note, 23 So. Cal. L. Rev. 583 (1950).
33. The "real defenses" are enumerated in section 3-305. One of these is "such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument with neither knowledge
nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms."
Comment 7 to this section indicates that this defense extends to an instrument signed
with knowledge that it is a negotiable instrument, but without knowledge of its essential terms. It recognizes, in short, the defense of "real" or "essential" fraud. This
defense could apparently be maintained under circumstances in which the finance
company has dealt with a patently dishonest merchant.
34. Note, Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
754 (1962).
35. See notes 16, 17 & 24 supra and accompanying text.
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Except as provided in the Uniform Commercial Code36 . . . the
assignee has a right of action in his own name, subject to any defense
or setoff, legal or equitable, which the maker or debtor had against
any assignor before notice of his assignment.
In Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley,3 7 the Massachusetts court recognized
a very similar statute s to be primarily a procedural statute 9 designed to insure the right of an assignee to maintain an action in
his own name. Nonetheless, that court gave weight to additional
considerations (i.e., the waiver clause was a blanket provision and
was set out in a long, closely-worded printed form) and held that
a waiver clause like that contemplated by section 9-206 should be
disregarded as contrary to the policy of the statute.4 °
Hurley may be construed as authority to find that section 50-7-1
establishes a rule different than contemplated by section 9-206 in
New Mexico with regard to consumer goods. The Cantrelldecision
further indicates a readiness to liberally apply statutes primarily
procedural in nature to protect an unsophisticated purchaser. However, to predicate a statement that New Mexico does have a different rule for consumer goods solely on these two factors would be to
do an injustice to the policy behind the UCC. The language of section 50-7-1 and the UCC, though strangely circuitous, 4 does not
demand such a conclusion.
What is intended by the UCC, in the interests of stable and predictable commercial transactions, is a positive judicial or legislative
expression that consumer goods transactions are to be specially
regulated. The UCC provides adequate safeguards for the regulation of questionable financing practices; these safeguards are properly used to curtail only those practices, not to curtail financing
activities indiscriminately, as the case would be if section 50-7-1 is
construed like the counterclaim statute in Cantrell. Section 9-206
buries Cantrell; its ghost should not be allowed to restrain reasonable business practices.
THOMAS L. BONHAM
36.
37.
38.
39.

Amended to take in this exception by N.M. Laws 1961, ch. 96, § 11-106.
337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958).
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, § 5 (1956).
See Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152

(1933).
40. Contra, Jones v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 88 Ga. App. 24, 75 S.E.2d 822
(1953) (involving a similar statute).
41. Section 9-206 is, in the consumer goods area, expressly made subject to any
statute or decision establishing a different rule. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50-7-1 (Repl. 1962),
expressly excepts provisions in the UCC.

